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Business Explainer | June 9, 2026
In 2022, Think and Learn Private Limited, the parent company of Byju’s, was valued at $22 billion and was the most valuable startup in India’s history. By July 16, 2024, the Bengaluru bench of the National Company Law Tribunal admitted it into Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process on a default of Rs 158.9 crore owed to the Board of Control for Cricket in India, a sum that is less than 0.1 percent of its peak valuation. What followed was not a straightforward bankruptcy proceeding. It was a two-year legal labyrinth involving a disputed settlement, a Supreme Court reversal, a resolution professional removed for misconduct, a $1.2 billion cross-border creditor dispute, a record-low bidder interest at the expression of interest stage, and a 2026 amendment to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code that was directly inspired by lessons from the Byju’s case. This article traces every significant step of the CIRP, explains each IBC mechanism triggered along the way, and assesses what the case reveals about the strengths and structural gaps of India’s insolvency framework.
Table of Contents
- Part I: How the IBC Works: The Framework Behind the Byju’s Case CIRP mechanics, the moratorium, committee of creditors, and the 330-day outer limit
- Part II: How Byju’s Got Here: From $22 Billion to NCLT in 30 Months The $1.2 billion Term Loan B, the $533 million transfer dispute, and the BCCI sponsorship default
- Part III: The CIRP in Motion: Admission, Moratorium, and the First Committee of Creditors July 16, 2024 NCLT order, Pankaj Srivastava’s appointment, and the CoC composition battle
- Part IV: The Settlement That Was Not: NCLAT, the Supreme Court, and Section 12A The BCCI settlement, Glas Trust’s challenge, and the Supreme Court’s October 23, 2024 ruling
- Part V: Resolution Professional Misconduct: A Case Study in IBC Safeguards Creditor reclassification, CoC reconstitution, NCLT’s January 29, 2025 order, and Shailendra Ajmera’s appointment
- Part VI: The Resolution Process and What the Byju’s Case Reveals About IBC EoI stage, bidder disinterest, the Aakash complication, and IBC’s structural lessons
- Frequently Asked Questions
Rs 158.9cr
Unpaid BCCI sponsorship dues that triggered India’s most high-profile insolvency petition, representing less than 0.1% of Byju’s $22 billion peak valuation.
$1.2bn
Term Loan B raised by Byju’s Alpha Inc. (US subsidiary) in November 2021, the largest single creditor claim in the insolvency, held by Glas Trust with a 99.41% CoC voting share.
3 courts
NCLT, NCLAT, and the Supreme Court of India have all issued substantive orders in the Byju’s insolvency, making it one of the most litigated CIRPs in IBC history.
688 days
Average CIRP completion time as of September 2025, far above the IBC’s statutory 330-day outer limit, a systemic problem that the Byju’s case exemplifies in full.
Part IHow the IBC Works: The Framework Behind the Byju’s Case
The Architecture of India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was India’s attempt to replace a fragmented, creditor-unfriendly debt resolution landscape with a single, time-bound framework. Before the IBC, creditors pursuing debt recovery had to navigate a patchwork of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, the SARFAESI Act, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, and winding-up petitions under the Companies Act, each with separate tribunals, separate timelines, and frequent cross-interference. The IBC consolidated all of this under a unified code with the NCLT as the adjudicating authority for corporate insolvency and the NCLAT as the appellate body.
Under the IBC, a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process can be initiated by three categories of applicants: a financial creditor (under Section 7), an operational creditor (under Section 9), or the corporate debtor itself (under Section 10). BCCI filed its petition under Section 9 as an operational creditor, representing an unpaid dues claim arising from a commercial contract rather than a financial borrowing. The threshold for admission under the IBC is a minimum default of Rs 1 crore, a floor that was raised from Rs 1 lakh in March 2020 to prevent frivolous petitions during the COVID-19 period.
Key IBC concepts used throughout this article: The Corporate Debtor is the company being resolved, in this case Think and Learn Private Limited. The Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) is appointed by the NCLT on admission and takes over management of the corporate debtor from its suspended board. The Committee of Creditors (CoC) is a body of financial creditors constituted by the IRP, which holds voting power over major decisions including approval of resolution plans. The Resolution Professional (RP) is the IRP or a replacement appointed by the CoC after constitution. The moratorium under Section 14 is a stay on all legal proceedings and asset transfers against the corporate debtor, effective from the date of CIRP admission. Section 12A governs withdrawal of an insolvency application after admission, requiring approval of at least 90 percent of the CoC.
The Time Limits: 180, 270, and 330 Days
The IBC prescribes strict timelines. A CIRP must be completed within 180 days of admission, extendable by 90 days with NCLT approval on sufficient cause, bringing the total to 270 days. The IBC Amendment of 2019 added a further outer limit of 330 days, which includes time spent in litigation. Beyond 330 days, the corporate debtor is to be sent for liquidation unless a resolution plan has been approved. In practice, as of September 2025, the average CIRP completion time had risen to 688 days, more than double the statutory outer limit, driven primarily by litigation at NCLT, NCLAT, and the Supreme Court. The Byju’s case, initiated July 16, 2024 and still without an approved resolution plan as of the date of this article, is already well past the 330-day mark and serves as a live illustration of this gap between statutory intent and judicial reality.
| IBC Stage | Statutory Timeline | What Happens | In Byju’s Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of CIRP | Day 0 | NCLT admits petition; moratorium begins; IRP appointed | July 16, 2024 |
| Constitution of CoC | Within 30 days of admission | IRP collates creditor claims; constitutes CoC of financial creditors | First CoC constituted August 21, 2024 |
| CIRP completion deadline | 180 days (extendable to 270) | Resolution plan to be approved by CoC and NCLT | Missed; proceedings still ongoing (June 2026) |
| Outer time limit | 330 days (including litigation) | If no plan approved, corporate debtor goes to liquidation | Breached; NCLT has not ordered liquidation given pending resolution process |
| EoI invitation | After CoC constitution | RP invites expressions of interest from prospective resolution applicants | First EoI invited September 1, 2025; deadline extended to November 13, 2025 |
| Resolution plan deadline | Per RP timeline in Form G | Qualified bidders submit resolution plans | January 12, 2026 (per extended timeline) |
Part IIHow Byju’s Got Here: From $22 Billion to NCLT in 30 Months
The Pandemic Peak and the $1.2 Billion Loan
Byju’s growth story was a product of the pandemic. School closures across India and globally from March 2020 drove a surge in demand for online learning platforms, and Think and Learn’s flagship Byju’s Learning App saw subscriber numbers multiply rapidly. Flush with investor confidence, the company raised capital at an accelerating pace, reaching a peak valuation of $22 billion in early 2022. In November 2021, at the height of this growth narrative, Byju’s US subsidiary Byju’s Alpha Inc. raised a $1.2 billion Term Loan B (TLB) from a consortium of institutional lenders, with Glas Trust Company LLC acting as the trustee representing this lender group. The loan was structured with a November 2026 repayment date.
The problems began in late 2022. Byju’s missed a September 2022 deadline to file its audited financial results for FY22, a technical covenant breach under the TLB agreement. Lenders hired Houlihan Lokey to advise them and began pushing for immediate partial repayment by December 2022. Glas Trust, through the lender group, formally declared the covenant breached and, in March 2023, accelerated the loan, making the entire $1.2 billion immediately due. Byju’s contested the acceleration as wrongful. In May 2023, Glas Trust filed a lawsuit against Byju’s Alpha and related entities in the US state of Delaware to recover the outstanding amount. The dispute over whether the lenders wrongfully accelerated the loan, and a separate allegation that approximately $533 million had been moved out of the US in breach of the loan agreement, became the central controversy in all subsequent proceedings, both in Indian and American courts.
The $533 million transfer: from allegation to judicial finding: Glas Trust alleged in US court filings that Byju’s had transferred approximately $533 million from Byju’s Alpha’s US accounts to a third party, Camshaft Capital Fund, in breach of the loan agreement’s restrictions on fund movement. Byju’s denied that the funds were misappropriated, asserting they were legitimately deployed. However, on February 28, 2025, the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a summary judgment finding that the transfers constituted actual fraudulent transfers and conversion (i.e., theft), and that Riju Raveendran had breached his fiduciary duties as a director of Byju’s Alpha. The court described Camshaft Capital as a sham hedge fund. The allegation of tainted funds, specifically that the settlement money offered to BCCI may have originated from these improperly moved TLB proceeds, was the core objection Glas Trust raised before the NCLAT when the BCCI settlement was being considered, and the reason the Supreme Court ultimately set aside that settlement.
The BCCI Sponsorship Default and the Insolvency Trigger
Separately from the TLB dispute, Byju’s had signed a sponsorship agreement with BCCI in 2019, under which the Byju’s brand appeared on the official jerseys of the Indian cricket team. The contract was extended until November 2023. When the agreement ended in 2023, Byju’s owed BCCI Rs 158.9 crore in unpaid sponsorship dues, an amount owed under a commercial contract, making BCCI an operational creditor under the IBC. BCCI filed a Section 9 petition before the NCLT in 2023. After attempts at settlement failed, the NCLT Bengaluru bench admitted the petition on July 16, 2024, initiating CIRP against Think and Learn Private Limited.
The choice of the BCCI as the petitioner that ultimately cracked Byju’s open is analytically interesting. Several other vendors had previously approached the NCLT, but Byju’s had managed to settle or delay those proceedings. The BCCI, as a high-profile institutional body with public accountability, was harder to delay and more difficult to negotiate away quietly. The NCLT on July 16, 2024 also dismissed Byju’s attempt to refer the matter to arbitration, finding that the existence of a debt and default was clearly established and that arbitration was not a permissible diversion from the IBC process once a valid petition had been filed.
Part IIIThe CIRP in Motion: Admission, Moratorium, and the First Committee of Creditors
Day Zero: July 16, 2024
Upon admission of the CIRP on July 16, 2024, three things happened simultaneously. First, a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC took effect, prohibiting any new legal proceedings against Think and Learn, suspending all ongoing suits, freezing asset transfers, and halting enforcement actions. Second, the powers of the board of directors of Think and Learn, including founders Byju Raveendran and Divya Gokulnath, were suspended, with management vesting in the Interim Resolution Professional. Third, the NCLT appointed Pankaj Srivastava as the IRP, whose first task was to invite creditor claims and constitute the Committee of Creditors.
The initial CoC was constituted on August 21, 2024. The claims submitted revealed the true shape of Byju’s financial exposure. Glas Trust Company LLC submitted a claim of Rs 11,432.99 crore (approximately Rs 11,433 crore) representing the guaranteed obligations on Byju’s Alpha’s $1.2 billion TLB. Aditya Birla Finance Limited submitted a claim of Rs 47.12 crore. InCred Financial Services Limited submitted a claim of Rs 20.35 crore. ICICI Bank’s claim was effectively nil, as the margin money against bank guarantees had already been invoked. The initial CoC thus had Glas Trust holding 99.41 percent of the voting share, Aditya Birla Finance with 0.41 percent, and InCred with 0.18 percent.
Why Glas Trust’s 99.41% voting share is structurally significant: Under the IBC, most key CoC decisions require a 66 percent voting majority, and approval of a resolution plan requires 66 percent. With 99.41 percent of the voting share, Glas Trust held effective veto power over every single CoC decision. Any resolution applicant seeking to acquire Byju’s would need Glas Trust’s approval. Any withdrawal application under Section 12A required 90 percent CoC approval, meaning Glas Trust alone could block withdrawal. This concentration of voting power in a single cross-border creditor, representing a disputed $1.2 billion TLB, meant that the entire IBC process in India was, in practical terms, hostage to the outcome of the parallel US litigation between Glas Trust and Byju’s.
Part IVThe Settlement That Was Not: NCLAT, the Supreme Court, and Section 12A
The BCCI Settlement and the NCLAT’s First Order
Almost immediately after the CIRP was admitted, Byju Raveendran’s brother Riju Raveendran arranged for the payment of Rs 158 crore to BCCI to settle the sponsorship dues. BCCI accepted the settlement and, on this basis, the NCLAT on August 2, 2024 set aside the NCLT’s insolvency order, approving the settlement and halting the CIRP. The NCLAT also dismissed Glas Trust’s allegation of round-tripping, holding that Glas Trust had failed to provide sufficient evidence that the settlement funds were tainted.
Glas Trust immediately challenged the NCLAT order before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, on August 14, 2024, stayed the NCLAT’s ruling while the matter was heard. After hearing arguments, the Supreme Court on October 23, 2024 set aside the NCLAT order entirely. The bench held that the settlement did not follow the due process mandated by Section 12A of the IBC. Specifically, a withdrawal application under Section 12A must be filed by the IRP before the CoC, approved by at least 90 percent of the CoC, and then submitted to the NCLT for formal approval. None of these steps had occurred. The parties had attempted to bypass the CoC entirely. The Supreme Court directed that the Rs 158 crore paid by Riju Raveendran, along with accrued interest, be deposited with the CoC in an escrow account and directed the NCLT to consider the withdrawal application afresh through proper process.
Why this ruling changed IBC jurisprudence on settlement exits: The Supreme Court’s October 23, 2024 judgment in Glas Trust Company LLC v. Byju Raveendran and Others (2024 INSC 811) established a clear and binding principle: once a CIRP is admitted and a CoC constituted, neither the petitioning creditor nor the corporate debtor can settle their bilateral dispute and exit the insolvency process without CoC approval. The insolvency process, once set in motion, belongs to all creditors collectively, not just the one who filed. This principle was subsequently codified in the 2026 amendment to Section 12A of the IBC, which also introduced a provision that once an EoI has been issued, the withdrawal option is permanently closed to protect prospective resolution applicants who have invested in due diligence.
The CoC Reconstitution Battle
While the settlement dispute was playing out at the appellate level, a separate conflict was developing over the composition of the CoC itself. After the Supreme Court’s August 2024 interim stay reinstated the CIRP, IRP Srivastava constituted the first CoC on August 21, 2024 with Glas Trust, Aditya Birla Finance, InCred Financial Services, and ICICI Bank. However, ten days later, on August 31, 2024, Srivastava reconstituted the CoC by removing Glas Trust and Aditya Birla Finance. He reclassified Aditya Birla Finance as an operational creditor rather than a financial creditor, and treated Glas Trust’s claim as contingent and not yet admissible. This left InCred Financial Services as the sole member of the CoC with 100 percent voting rights.
Glas Trust and Aditya Birla Finance challenged this reconstitution before the NCLT. At the same time, the reconstituted single-member CoC, on September 3, 2024, passed a resolution appointing Pankaj Srivastava himself as the Resolution Professional, converting his status from IRP to RP, a step that required CoC approval under the IBC but which the tribunal later found to be procedurally tainted given the circumstances of the CoC’s constitution.
Part VResolution Professional Misconduct: A Case Study in IBC Safeguards
The NCLT’s January 29, 2025 Order
On January 29, 2025, the NCLT Bengaluru bench, in a comprehensive order by justices K. Biswal and Ravichandran Ramaswamy, ruled on the challenges filed by Glas Trust and Aditya Birla Finance. The tribunal found that Srivastava’s decision to remove Glas Trust and Aditya Birla Finance from the CoC was without valid basis under the IBC. There is no provision in the Code allowing a resolution professional to change the classification of a creditor from financial to operational, or to exclude a creditor whose claim has been admitted, without the approval of the adjudicating authority. The NCLT reinstated the CoC constituted on August 21, 2024 and set aside all decisions made by the reconstituted CoC, including the resolution appointing Srivastava as RP.
More significantly, the NCLT found that Srivastava’s conduct was not fit and proper as expected from an officer of the tribunal. The bench observed that his actions were prejudicial to the interests of the CIRP and its stakeholders, and that his conduct appeared designed to mislead the tribunal. The NCLT directed the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Srivastava. This was one of the most explicit reprimands issued by a tribunal against an IRP in the IBC’s history. The CoC was directed to appoint a new resolution professional.
What this episode reveals about IRP accountability under the IBC: The IRP and RP are officers of the tribunal and are supposed to act as neutral administrators of the insolvency process, balancing the interests of all stakeholders. The Byju’s case exposed the risk of an IRP being susceptible to pressure from the corporate debtor or its promoters. The NCLT noted that Srivastava’s own submission was that he had acted under pressure from Glas Trust, while simultaneously taking actions that appeared to disadvantage Glas Trust. The IBBI, as the regulator of insolvency professionals, has the power to suspend or cancel an IRP’s registration following disciplinary proceedings. The Byju’s episode contributed directly to the IBBI’s 2025 discussion paper proposing stricter conduct norms and mandatory recording of CoC decisions to prevent IRP overreach.
Shailendra Ajmera and the Fresh Start
Following the January 29 order, the reconstituted CoC (with Glas Trust, Aditya Birla Finance, and InCred) appointed Shailendra Ajmera, a partner at Ernst and Young, as the new Resolution Professional. The NCLT Bengaluru bench formally approved Ajmera’s appointment on February 24, 2025. Ajmera had previously served as the Resolution Professional (RP) in the Go First airline insolvency, having been appointed by that CoC after the initial IRP, which ended in liquidation after no viable resolution plan was received. His appointment marked the restart of the effective CIRP, with the NCLT directing the BCCI to submit its Rs 158 crore withdrawal application before the CoC under Section 12A for the CoC’s consideration.
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Jul 16, 2024NCLT admits BCCI petition; CIRP begins
Think and Learn Pvt Ltd admitted to CIRP. Pankaj Srivastava appointed IRP. Moratorium under Section 14 takes effect. Byju Raveendran and Divya Gokulnath suspended as directors.
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Aug 2, 2024NCLAT sets aside CIRP on BCCI settlement of Rs 158 crore
Riju Raveendran pays Rs 158 crore to BCCI. NCLAT approves settlement and halts insolvency. Glas Trust’s round-tripping allegation dismissed by NCLAT.
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Aug 14, 2024Supreme Court stays NCLAT order
Glas Trust moves Supreme Court. Apex court stays NCLAT ruling; CIRP effectively reinstated pending hearing.
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Aug 21, 2024First CoC constituted
Glas Trust (99.41% voting share), Aditya Birla Finance (0.41%), InCred Financial Services (0.18%), ICICI Bank (nil claim) form the first CoC.
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Aug 31, 2024IRP reconstitutes CoC, removes Glas Trust and Aditya Birla Finance
Srivastava reclassifies Aditya Birla Finance as operational creditor; excludes Glas Trust’s claim as contingent. InCred Financial becomes sole CoC member with 100% voting rights.
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Oct 23, 2024Supreme Court sets aside NCLAT settlement order (2024 INSC 811)
Landmark ruling: settlement bypassed Section 12A process. Rs 158 crore deposited in escrow with CoC. Matter remitted to NCLT. CIRP formally and finally reinstated.
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Jan 29, 2025NCLT removes Pankaj Srivastava; orders IBBI disciplinary action
Original CoC of August 21, 2024 reinstated. Srivastava’s decisions quashed. IBBI directed to initiate disciplinary proceedings. CoC to appoint new RP.
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Feb 11, 2025Shailendra Ajmera (EY) appointed new Resolution Professional
CoC appoints Ajmera. NCLT formally approves on February 24, 2025. Fresh CIRP restart. NCLT directs BCCI to place withdrawal application before CoC under Section 12A.
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Sep 1, 2025RP invites EoI from prospective resolution applicants
Ajmera issues Form G inviting expressions of interest. Original deadline September 24, 2025. Extended to November 13, 2025 due to limited bidder interest.
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Jan 12, 2026Deadline for submission of formal resolution plans
Per revised Form G timeline. The last audited financial statements available were for FY22. ~3,100 employees remain. As of June 9, 2026, no resolution plan has been approved by CoC.
Part VIThe Resolution Process and What the Byju’s Case Reveals About IBC
Bidder Disinterest and the EoI Extension
When Ajmera issued the first EoI on September 1, 2025, the response was markedly underwhelming. The September 24, 2025 deadline passed with insufficient qualified interest, and the deadline was extended to November 13, 2025. The EoI document itself disclosed a significant information gap: Byju’s last audited financial statements available to resolution applicants were for FY22 (the year ending March 2022), more than three years before the EoI was issued. Details on the quantity and value of products sold in subsequent financial years were described in the document as “presently not available.” No audited accounts existed for FY23, FY24, or FY25. For any serious bidder conducting due diligence on a potential acquisition, the absence of three years of audited financials is a fundamental obstacle to valuation and risk assessment.
The auditor resignations and the information vacuum: Byju’s had already lost its first auditor, Deloitte, in June 2023. Deloitte resigned citing the long-delayed FY22 financial statements and its inability to complete the audit. BDO (MSKA & Associates) was appointed as replacement statutory auditor. Then, in September 2024, shortly after the CIRP began, BDO also resigned. BDO’s resignation letter cited lack of transparency from the company’s management, inadequate support to complete the audit despite inordinate delays in filing FY23 financials, and concerns about suspicious transactions involving a Dubai-based entity that had been reported to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. BDO’s exit, the second auditor resignation in under two years, left the CIRP without an independent auditor to certify financial statements, deepening the information asymmetry that already existed from three years of unfiled accounts. The absence of reliable financial data is one of the most practically damaging aspects of the Byju’s case for resolution prospects: a company cannot attract credible resolution applicants if no one can reliably determine what it is worth or what its liabilities actually are.
The Aakash Complication
Byju’s most valuable subsidiary, Aakash Educational Services Limited, which Byju’s acquired in 2021 for approximately $1 billion in a cash-and-stock deal, has become a separate legal battlefield within the insolvency. Aakash sought to amend its Articles of Association to raise capital independently of its parent. Think and Learn, as Aakash’s majority shareholder and the corporate debtor in CIRP, contested this through the RP, arguing that any dilution of its stake in Aakash would impair the value available to creditors in the resolution. The Supreme Court in November 2024 barred Aakash from implementing AoA amendments. The NCLAT in October 2025 allowed the fund-raise while directing Think and Learn to subscribe proportionately. Aakash did not allot shares to Think and Learn, citing FEMA compliance concerns about the source of the RP’s funds. In February 2026, Think and Learn moved the Supreme Court again. As of June 2026, the Aakash ownership and rights issue dispute remains unresolved, creating uncertainty over whether Aakash, the single most valuable asset in the corporate debtor’s estate, can be cleanly included in any resolution plan.
Four Structural Lessons the Byju’s Case Teaches About the IBC
The first lesson is about operational creditor triggers and their unintended consequences. The IBC allows any operational creditor with a default above Rs 1 crore to file for CIRP. In Byju’s case, a Rs 158.9 crore default by an entity with Rs 11,000 crore in financial creditor claims opened a CIRP that the operational creditor, BCCI, itself tried to exit almost immediately after. The trigger mechanism, designed to democratise creditor access to the IBC, produced a process driven by a petitioner whose interests were settled before the process was even properly underway.
The second lesson is about cross-border debt and domestic insolvency proceedings. Glas Trust’s $1.2 billion TLB claim arose from a loan to a US subsidiary, secured by a guarantee from the Indian parent. The interaction between US Chapter 11 proceedings against Byju’s US subsidiaries and the Indian CIRP against the Indian parent created jurisdictional complexity that the IBC framework, designed for domestic debt, was not equipped to handle smoothly. The IRP’s letter to the US Delaware court noting that the Chapter 11 order was “surprising” and “in conflict” with Indian insolvency proceedings illustrates the gap.
The third lesson is about resolution professional accountability. The IBC vests enormous discretionary power in the IRP and RP, who control the corporate debtor’s management, constitute the CoC, admit or reject creditor claims, and manage the entire process. The Byju’s case exposed the risk of an IRP using this power improperly. The IBBI’s disciplinary referral of Srivastava, and the NCLT’s explicit finding that his conduct was designed to mislead the tribunal, have already produced regulatory responses: stricter conduct norms for insolvency professionals were proposed in the IBBI’s 2025 discussion paper.
The fourth lesson is about information disclosure as a prerequisite for resolution. A CIRP cannot produce a credible resolution plan without reliable financial information about the corporate debtor. The absence of three years of audited financial statements in the Byju’s case is not a minor procedural gap. It is a fundamental impediment to the valuation, due diligence, and risk assessment that any serious resolution applicant must complete before bidding. The IBC currently has no mechanism to compel promoters to file overdue accounts as a prerequisite to initiating or continuing CIRP, a gap that the case makes urgent.
The 2026 IBC amendment triggered by the Byju’s settlement episode: The Supreme Court’s October 2024 ruling in Glas Trust v. Byju Raveendran directly informed a 2026 amendment to Section 12A of the IBC. The amendment tightens the settlement-exit framework in two key ways. First, it inserts a mandatory 30-day deadline within which the NCLT must decide on a Section 12A withdrawal application once submitted. Second, and most significantly, it provides that once a Form G expression of interest has been issued by the RP, the settlement withdrawal option under Section 12A is permanently unavailable. The policy rationale is that from the moment prospective resolution applicants are publicly invited and spend resources on due diligence, they acquire a legitimate interest in the process that cannot be overridden by a bilateral settlement between the original petitioner and the corporate debtor. The Byju’s case, in this sense, has already produced durable legislative reform even before its own resolution is complete.
Frequently Asked Questions
As of June 9, 2026, Think and Learn Private Limited remains in an active Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under the supervision of Resolution Professional Shailendra Ajmera. The company has been under CIRP since July 16, 2024, making it well past the IBC’s statutory 330-day outer limit. The EoI process was concluded with an extended deadline of November 13, 2025, and formal resolution plans were due by January 12, 2026. No resolution plan has been publicly confirmed as approved by the CoC or the NCLT as of the date of this article. The Aakash Educational Services subsidiary remains in a separate legal dispute over shareholding and a rights issue that has not been resolved. The BCCI’s Section 12A withdrawal application, seeking to exit the insolvency upon payment of the Rs 158 crore now held in escrow, has been pending before the CoC. Multiple appellate proceedings remain active before the NCLAT and the Supreme Court.
A financial creditor is an entity to which a financial debt is owed, broadly meaning money borrowed under a loan, bond, debenture, or similar financial instrument, including interest. Banks, NBFCs, and bond investors are typically financial creditors. A financial creditor files for CIRP under Section 7 of the IBC. An operational creditor is an entity to which an operational debt is owed arising from the provision of goods, services, employment, or government dues, covering trade creditors, vendors, employees, and contract counterparties. An operational creditor files under Section 9. The distinction matters enormously in the CIRP because only financial creditors form the Committee of Creditors and hold voting power over the resolution plan. Operational creditors do not have a seat in the CoC. In the Byju’s case, BCCI was an operational creditor (unpaid sponsorship dues from a commercial contract), while Glas Trust, Aditya Birla Finance, and InCred were financial creditors. The controversy over whether Aditya Birla Finance was a financial or operational creditor in this case was at the heart of the IRP’s disputed reclassification decision.
Technically, a Section 12A withdrawal application has been placed before the CoC. For it to succeed, 90 percent of the CoC must approve it. Glas Trust, with 99.41 percent of the voting share, must therefore approve the withdrawal. Glas Trust has consistently opposed the settlement, arguing that the settlement funds may be tainted money and that its own $1.2 billion TLB claim would not be addressed by a mere Rs 158 crore payment to BCCI. As a practical matter, Glas Trust has every incentive to block withdrawal under Section 12A, because withdrawal would end the CIRP and remove the one legal lever in India through which Glas Trust can assert pressure for repayment of the TLB. Additionally, as a result of the 2026 amendment to Section 12A, the Form G EoI having already been issued by RP Ajmera in September 2025, withdrawal is now permanently closed under the amended law regardless of CoC voting. The Rs 158 crore held in escrow will likely be distributed to the CoC as part of any eventual resolution plan or liquidation proceeds.
Under Section 33 of the IBC, if the CoC does not receive any resolution plan within the CIRP period, or if the received plans are rejected, the NCLT must order the corporate debtor into liquidation. In liquidation, the assets of the company are sold and the proceeds are distributed to creditors in a strict waterfall order: insolvency resolution costs first, then workmen’s dues, then secured financial creditors, then unsecured financial creditors, then government dues, then operational creditors, and finally equity shareholders. In Byju’s case, with Glas Trust’s claim of approximately Rs 11,433 crore dominating the creditor list, the proceeds from liquidating a company whose last audited net worth is unknown would very likely be insufficient to satisfy even the secured financial creditor claims. Liquidation of Byju’s, if it comes to that, would represent one of the most visible failures of the IBC’s resolution-first mandate, and would almost certainly result in near-total loss for employees, operational creditors, and equity investors.
The Byju’s collapse and insolvency has had a chilling effect on investor sentiment toward edtech in India specifically, and toward high-growth loss-making startups more broadly. Three specific signals stand out. First, it demonstrated that governance failures, including missing audit deadlines, disputed fund transfers, and opaque financial reporting, can trigger a cascade of legal consequences that a high valuation cannot insulate a company from. Second, it illustrated that cross-border debt structures, particularly large-dollar TLBs raised by offshore subsidiaries with Indian parent guarantees, create legal complexity that India’s domestic insolvency framework is not fully equipped to manage. Third, it showed that the shift from pandemic-era growth metrics to profitability expectations can be fatal for companies that expanded their cost base on the assumption that high-valuation funding rounds would continue indefinitely. For Indian startups currently relying on international institutional debt, the Byju’s case is a concrete demonstration of the consequences of TLB covenant breaches and the legal weaponisation of acceleration clauses by offshore lenders.
A $22 Billion Company, a Rs 158 Crore Default, and Two Years of Legal History
The Byju’s insolvency will be studied in Indian commercial law classrooms for years, not because of the scale of the debt (there have been larger CIRPs) but because of the density of legal questions it has compressed into a single proceeding. In less than two years, the case has produced a Supreme Court judgment that redefined the Section 12A settlement framework, an NCLT order that is among the most explicit judicial reprimands of a resolution professional in IBC history, a legislative amendment directly inspired by the case, a cross-border insolvency conflict between Indian and US courts that the IBC had no clear mechanism to resolve, and an EoI process notable primarily for the disinterest it attracted.
The IBC’s foundational promise was time-bound resolution with creditor control. In the Byju’s case, the statutory timeline was breached before the effective CIRP had even properly restarted after the RP’s removal. Creditor control was distorted by the concentration of 99.41 percent voting power in a single offshore creditor whose primary interest was not the resolution of an Indian company but the recovery of a $1.2 billion cross-border loan. The resolution professional appointed to neutrally administer the process was removed by the tribunal for misconduct. The most valuable subsidiary became entangled in a separate litigation tree that is still unresolved.
None of this means the IBC is broken. It means the IBC is being tested by a case of unusual complexity, one that involves offshore TLB debt, contested fund transfers, three years of unaudited accounts, a high-profile petitioner who wanted out almost immediately, and a promoter who has contested the process at every stage. The framework has, with delays and imperfections, produced substantive legal outcomes: the settlement jurisprudence is stronger, the RP accountability norms are tighter, and the 2026 amendment has plugged a real gap. What the Byju’s case has not yet produced is a resolution. That remains the outstanding question.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational and educational purposes only and is current as of June 9, 2026. All facts and dates are drawn from primary sources including NCLT Bengaluru orders, NCLAT orders, Supreme Court of India judgments (including 2024 INSC 811), IBBI public disclosures and creditor lists filed with the IBBI, and official CIRP documents. Nothing in this article constitutes legal or investment advice.
