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- Quick SnapshotThe whole case in 3 minutes with a self-made example
- Part I: What Was Essar Steel?The Ruia family, Hazira plant, debt accumulation, and the RBI list
- Part II: IBC Basics Before the CaseHow CIRP works and why Essar Steel was the first real stress test
- Part III: NCLT Admission and the Resolution ProcessAugust 2017, Standard Chartered’s application, and early bidder drama
- Part IV: The Section 29A Eligibility BattleArcelorMittal vs Numetal, the NPA disqualification, and the Supreme Court’s October 2018 order
- Part V: ArcelorMittal’s Resolution PlanRs 42,000 crore bid, CoC approval, and the creditor distribution controversy
- Part VI: The NCLAT Judgment and What It Got WrongJuly 2019 order, equal treatment of all creditors, and why the Supreme Court overruled it
- Part VII: The Supreme Court JudgmentNovember 15, 2019 and the six holdings that define IBC today
- Part VIII: Acquisition CompletedAM/NS India, December 15 2019, and the plant today
- Part IX: What Essar Steel Changed for Indian Insolvency LawPrecedents, legislative amendments, and cases shaped by this judgment
- Frequently Asked Questions
Quick Snapshot: The Whole Case in 3 Minutes
In 2017, Standard Chartered Bank and SBI dragged Essar Steel India Limited into India’s then-new insolvency tribunal. The company owed Rs 49,395 crore to financial creditors and Rs 4,976 crore to operational creditors. ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steelmaker, wanted to buy it. So did a company called Numetal. Both were found ineligible by the Resolution Professional. Both challenged this. The Supreme Court agreed they were ineligible but gave them two weeks to cure the defect by paying off bad loans of related entities. ArcelorMittal paid. Numetal did not. ArcelorMittal’s plan for Rs 42,000 crore was then approved by 92.24% of the Committee of Creditors.
| Key Fact | Verified Detail |
|---|---|
| Case citation | Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 531 |
| NCLT admission date | August 2, 2017 (NCLT Ahmedabad Bench, Company Petition I.B. No. 39 of 2017) |
| Application filed by | Standard Chartered Bank and SBI jointly, under Section 7 of the IBC |
| Resolution Professional appointed | Satish Kumar Gupta (as Interim RP, later confirmed as RP) |
| Financial creditor admitted claims | Rs 49,395 crore (secured) and Rs 3,187 crore (Standard Chartered, classified unsecured/foreign currency) |
| Operational creditor admitted claims | Rs 4,976 crore |
| ArcelorMittal resolution plan (upfront) | Rs 42,000 crore (later finalised at Rs 42,785 crore on acquisition) |
| Additional equity infusion committed | Rs 8,000 crore for capital expenditure and growth |
| CoC vote in favour | 92.24% (October 24, 2018) |
| Supreme Court judgment date | November 15, 2019 |
| Acquisition completed | December 16, 2019 (press release date); acquisition signed December 15, 2019 |
| Acquirer entity | AM/NS India (ArcelorMittal 60% + Nippon Steel 40% joint venture) |
| Financial creditor recovery (secured) | Approximately 92% of admitted claims |
| Operational creditor recovery | Rs 214 crore against Rs 4,976 crore admitted claims (approximately 4.3%) |
Part IWhat Was Essar Steel?
The Ruia Family and the Birth of Essar Steel
The Essar Group was founded in 1969 by brothers Shashi Ruia and Ravi Ruia, beginning with a Rs 2.3 crore contract for constructing an outer breakwater at Chennai Port. Over the following decades, the group diversified into shipping, oil and gas, power, and steel. In 1975, the group established Essar Gujarat to produce sponge iron ore. This entity later evolved into Essar Steel India Limited, headquartered in Mumbai with its primary manufacturing complex at Hazira, Gujarat.
Essar Steel was one of India’s early private sector steel producers, at a time when the sector was dominated by state-owned SAIL and RINL. It pioneered gas-based sponge iron production in India through its Hazira facility. The company listed on Indian stock markets and then went private in 2007 when the promoters decided to delist it.
The Hazira Complex: India’s Largest Single-Location Flat Steel Producer
The Hazira plant in Gujarat was the crown jewel of Essar Steel. In May 2012, Essar Steel completed a major capacity expansion at Hazira, doubling annual crude steel production capacity to 10 million tonnes per annum (MTPA). This made Hazira the largest single-location flat steel producer in India and the fourth-largest such facility globally at the time. The company also operated iron ore pellet and beneficiation plants in the east of India. Including its operations in the United States and Canada, Essar Steel had a global steelmaking capacity of 14 MTPA. The total investment in the Hazira complex alone was Rs 37,500 crore.
How the Debt Accumulated
The Hazira expansion was financed almost entirely through debt. At Rs 37,500 crore of investment in the Hazira complex against revenues that were insufficient to service the debt in the early years, the company’s interest burden was unsustainable. The company attempted to restructure, convert rupee debt to foreign currency debt, and improve capacity utilisation. By end of 2015, its total debt had accumulated to approximately Rs 42,000 crore. By the time it entered insolvency in August 2017, total debt exceeded Rs 54,000 crore across all creditors.
Part IIIBC Basics Before the Case
What the IBC Was Designed to Do
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 replaced a fragmented system of debt recovery laws. Before the IBC, creditors used SARFAESI, Debt Recovery Tribunals, the Companies Act winding-up provisions, and the SICA rehabilitation framework, none of which worked efficiently. Secured creditors could spend a decade recovering nothing. The IBC introduced a single, time-bound process for resolving insolvency. The core idea was simple: get the best resolution value for the business as a going concern, within 180 days (extendable to 270 days), failing which the company goes to liquidation.
Financial Creditors vs Operational Creditors: The IBC Definition
The IBC draws a fundamental distinction between two types of creditors. A financial creditor is one to whom a financial debt is owed, meaning money borrowed with interest, such as bank loans, debentures, or bonds. An operational creditor is one to whom an operational debt is owed in connection with the provision of goods or services, such as suppliers, employees, or government authorities claiming dues. Under the IBC, only financial creditors form the Committee of Creditors (CoC), which has decision-making power over the resolution process. Operational creditors are notified and may raise claims but cannot vote in the CoC.
Part IIINCLT Admission and the Early Resolution Process
The Application and Admission
Standard Chartered Bank filed an application under Section 7 of the IBC before the NCLT Ahmedabad Bench, together with a separate application by SBI. Section 7 allows a financial creditor to initiate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against a corporate debtor. On August 2, 2017, the NCLT Ahmedabad Bench admitted the petition as Company Petition (I.B.) No. 39 of 2017. Satish Kumar Gupta was appointed as the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) and was later confirmed as the Resolution Professional (RP). The moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC came into effect from the date of admission, protecting Essar Steel’s assets from enforcement actions by any creditor.
Claims and the Committee of Creditors
The RP invited claims from all creditors. Financial creditors filed claims aggregating Rs 49,395 crore in secured debts. Standard Chartered Bank’s position was peculiar: it had extended a foreign currency loan to an overseas subsidiary of Essar Steel and also held security over assets in India. The RP classified Standard Chartered as a secured financial creditor on September 10, 2018, after initial uncertainty. The CoC was constituted from financial creditors. The four largest exposures in the CoC were Edelweiss ARC (an asset reconstruction company holding assigned bank debt), SBI (Rs 13,222 crore), IDBI Bank, and ICICI Bank.
Expressions of Interest and the First Round of Bidding
On October 6, 2017, the RP published an advertisement in the Economic Times inviting Expressions of Interest from resolution applicants. ArcelorMittal India Private Limited and Numetal Limited submitted resolution plans. The RP examined both and declared them ineligible under Section 29A of the IBC. This triggered the first major legal battle of the case.
Part IVThe Section 29A Eligibility Battle
What Section 29A Does
Section 29A was inserted into the IBC by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017. It disqualifies any person from submitting a resolution plan who is a promoter, director, or key managerial person of the corporate debtor, or who is related to such a person, or who is a connected person whose related party has a non-performing asset (NPA) account or has otherwise been held responsible for the corporate debtor’s failure. The purpose is to prevent defaulting promoters from using the resolution process to buy back their own companies at a discount, evade accountability for the default, and continue in control of the same business.
Why Both ArcelorMittal and Numetal Were Initially Disqualified
ArcelorMittal’s disqualification arose because a related corporate debtor of ArcelorMittal (Uttam Galva Steels Limited) had an NPA account with Indian banks. Under Section 29A, the NPA of a related corporate debtor disqualifies the resolution applicant, regardless of whether the resolution applicant itself has any NPA. Similarly, Numetal’s disqualification arose from its shareholder structure: Aurora Enterprises Ltd, a significant shareholder in Numetal, was held by Rewant Ruia, the son of Ravi Ruia of the Essar Group. Since Ravi Ruia was a promoter of the corporate debtor (Essar Steel), the promoter-connected shareholding in Numetal made Numetal a “connected person” under Section 29A.
The Supreme Court’s October 4, 2018 Judgment
The disqualifications were challenged up to the Supreme Court. On October 4, 2018, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in ArcelorMittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2019) 2 SCC 1 held that both ArcelorMittal and Numetal were ineligible resolution applicants under Section 29A. However, exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the court granted both entities two weeks from the date of the judgment to pay off the NPAs of their related corporate debtors to cure their ineligibility. The court further held that if no plan was accepted with the requisite majority, Essar Steel would proceed to liquidation.
Part VArcelorMittal’s Resolution Plan and the Distribution Controversy
What the Plan Offered
| Component | Amount | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Upfront payment to creditors | Rs 42,000 crore | Final actual payment at acquisition: Rs 42,785 crore (inclusive of CIRP period profits) |
| Additional equity infusion | Rs 8,000 crore | Capital expenditure for plant upgradation and capacity expansion |
| Total enterprise consideration | Rs 50,000 crore+ | Upfront payment plus committed capex |
| Secured financial creditor recovery | ~92% (approx Rs 41,987 crore) | Against admitted secured claims of Rs 49,395 crore; SBI alone: ~92% of Rs 13,222 crore |
| Standard Chartered recovery | ~Rs 60 crore (about 2% initially) | Against admitted claims of Rs 3,187 crore; later revised upward following reclassification as secured financial creditor on September 10, 2018 |
| Operational creditors (claims below Rs 1 crore) | 100% of admitted claims | Small creditors paid in full under CoC decision |
| Operational creditors (claims above Rs 1 crore) | Rs 214 crore | Against Rs 4,976 crore in admitted claims; approximately 4.3% recovery |
Why the Differential Treatment Was Proposed
The plan provided for dramatically different recovery rates between secured financial creditors (approximately 92%) and large operational creditors (approximately 4.3%). The CoC’s rationale was clear: secured financial creditors had a charge over Essar Steel’s assets, had lent money at lower interest rates reflecting that security, and had been carrying the NPA on their books for years. Operational creditors, such as power companies, raw material suppliers, and logistics firms, had provided goods and services under commercial contracts and were not secured lenders. Treating them identically to secured banks would have either reduced the banks’ recovery far below the liquidation value of the secured assets or required ArcelorMittal to increase its offer, which the market process had not produced.
Part VIThe NCLAT Judgment: What It Got Wrong
The NCLT Ahmedabad’s March 8, 2019 Order
The NCLT Ahmedabad approved ArcelorMittal’s resolution plan on March 8, 2019. However, the NCLT went beyond mere approval. It suggested a modified 85:15 distribution ratio between financial and operational creditors (rather than the approximately 90:10 split in the plan) and suggested the CoC rework the distribution of funds. The NCLT indicated that operational creditors should receive a higher proportion. Deutsche Bank and SBI opposed this suggestion and filed petitions before the NCLAT. Multiple operational creditors also challenged the plan from the other side, seeking greater parity with financial creditors.
The NCLAT’s July 4, 2019 Order and Its Consequences
On July 4, 2019, the NCLAT issued a sweeping order. It approved ArcelorMittal’s resolution plan in broad terms but made four significant modifications that fundamentally altered the distribution of proceeds. First, it directed that all creditors (secured, unsecured, and operational) be treated at par, resulting in approximately 60.7% recovery for all creditors. Second, it increased the admitted claims of operational creditors to almost four times their originally admitted amounts. Third, it granted operational creditors whose claims had not been admitted by the NCLT or NCLAT the liberty to pursue those claims after the conclusion of CIRP. Fourth, it held that corporate and personal guarantees in respect of Essar Steel’s debt would come to an end upon clearance of the underlying debt through the resolution plan.
Standard Chartered’s Separate Grievance
Standard Chartered Bank was classified as a financial creditor but as an unsecured one (holding foreign currency exposure to an overseas subsidiary with Indian asset security). Under the original ArcelorMittal plan, Standard Chartered was to receive approximately Rs 60 crore against admitted claims of Rs 3,187 crore, a recovery of roughly 2%. Standard Chartered had throughout the proceedings argued for treatment as a secured financial creditor, which would entitle it to a pro rata share of the secured financial creditor pool of Rs 41,987 crore. The reclassification of Standard Chartered as secured on September 10, 2018 improved its position, but disputes over quantum continued before the appellate courts.
Part VIIThe Supreme Court Judgment: November 15, 2019
A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court heard multiple appeals arising from the NCLAT’s July 4, 2019 order. The bench delivered its judgment on November 15, 2019. The judgment runs to several hundred pages and covers six distinct legal questions. Taken together, its holdings form the constitutional and statutory basis of Indian insolvency law as it is practised today.
The Restoration of ArcelorMittal’s Plan
The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT’s order insofar as it had modified the distribution of resolution proceeds. The court restored the distribution as approved by the CoC on October 24, 2018. Secured financial creditors would receive approximately 92% of their admitted claims. Operational creditors with claims below Rs 1 crore would be paid in full. Operational creditors with claims above Rs 1 crore would receive Rs 214 crore in total. The plan, as approved by the CoC and the NCLT on March 8, 2019, was the operative document subject to the adjustment for CIRP period profits.
Part VIIIAcquisition Completed: AM/NS India
December 15 to 16, 2019: The Closing
On December 15, 2019, ArcelorMittal completed the acquisition of Essar Steel India Limited. ArcelorMittal simultaneously executed a joint venture agreement with Nippon Steel Corporation of Japan. The joint venture entity, named ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India Limited (AM/NS India), was established to own and operate Essar Steel’s assets. ArcelorMittal holds 60% of AM/NS India. Nippon Steel holds the remaining 40%. The total payment made by ArcelorMittal at acquisition was Rs 42,785 crore, which included the Rs 42,000 crore from the resolution plan plus the CIRP period profits allocated to creditors. ArcelorMittal also committed to a capital expenditure programme of Rs 8,000 crore.
On December 16, 2019, ArcelorMittal and Nippon Steel issued a joint press release confirming the completion. Aditya Mittal, President and CFO of ArcelorMittal, was appointed Chairman of AM/NS India. Dilip Oommen was appointed CEO. The CIRP, which had run for 865 days from admission to acquisition, was formally concluded.
AM/NS India: Post-Acquisition Performance
| Metric | At Time of Acquisition (December 2019) | As of 2022-23 |
|---|---|---|
| Annualised crude steel production | Approximately 7.5 MTPA | Growing; targeting 8.5 MTPA in medium term |
| Iron ore pellet capacity | 14 MTPA (east India facilities) | Maintained and expanded |
| Planned steel capacity (expansion) | Target 12-15 MTPA (long term) | Expansion capex of US $7.4 billion announced September 2022 to reach 15 MTPA by 2026 and potentially 24 MTPA by 2030 |
| Net debt (post acquisition) | Significant (inherited balance) | Reduced substantially per ArcelorMittal’s September 2022 investor event |
| EBITDA (Q1 2021) | Not applicable | US $403 million (Q1 2021), 188% YoY growth; FY21 run rate of US $1.6 billion |
| ArcelorMittal stake | 60% | 60% |
| Nippon Steel stake | 40% | 40% |
Part IXWhat Essar Steel Changed for Indian Insolvency Law
The Core Legal Precedents
Before Essar Steel, every aggrieved creditor could approach the NCLT or NCLAT to challenge the commercial terms of a resolution plan. The Supreme Court permanently ended this. Courts can verify procedural compliance. They cannot substitute their commercial judgment for that of the CoC. This holding has been cited in hundreds of subsequent IBC cases. Every time an operational creditor or dissenting financial creditor has tried to get a court to improve its recovery from a resolution plan, this holding is invoked against them. It made IBC resolutions commercially final in a way they were not before November 2019.
The NCLAT’s attempt to equalise all creditors was the single most disruptive ruling in Indian insolvency history. Had it stood, it would have eliminated the incentive for secured lending and destroyed the commercial logic of the IBC framework. The Supreme Court confirmed that Section 30(2)(b), which requires a resolution plan to pay operational creditors at least the liquidation value of their claims, means exactly what it says: a minimum, not an equal share. Secured financial creditors retain priority over their secured assets. This principle now guides distribution in every IBC resolution plan in India.
The constitutional validity of Section 29A was directly challenged in Essar Steel. The Supreme Court upheld it unambiguously. This confirmed that the bar on promoters re-acquiring their insolvent companies is not a temporary policy choice. It is a structural feature of the IBC that can be relied upon by creditors, bidders, and courts. Post Essar Steel, every bidder in an IBC process must meticulously verify its Section 29A compliance across all connected persons, related parties, and any NPA accounts in their broader group.
The NCLAT had held that guarantees die when the underlying debt is settled through the resolution plan. This would have made personal and corporate guarantees worthless in IBC contexts, removing a critical credit enhancement tool from the banking system. The Supreme Court reversed this, establishing that guarantees continue unless the resolution plan specifically and expressly provides for their extinguishment with creditor consent. This principle was subsequently clarified and reinforced in the Supreme Court’s personal guarantee judgments, including the landmark case on Section 95 proceedings against guarantors.
The IBC Amendment Act of 2019, which introduced a mandatory outer limit of 330 days for CIRP (including all litigation periods), was upheld as constitutionally valid. The irony was not lost on practitioners: the Essar Steel CIRP itself ran for 865 days, directly because of the litigation the case generated. The 330-day limit was partly a legislative response to precisely this kind of extended judicial intervention in IBC proceedings. Post-Essar Steel, courts are expected to give judicial proceedings in IBC cases utmost priority to stay within this limit.
Legislative Amendments Triggered by Essar Steel
| Amendment | Year | Connection to Essar Steel |
|---|---|---|
| IBC Amendment Act 2019: 330-day outer limit for CIRP | August 2019 | Directly passed during the Essar Steel appeals and upheld by the SC in the same judgment. Intended to prevent future Essar Steel-type 865-day processes. |
| IBC Amendment Act 2019: Minimum payment to operational creditors | August 2019 | Section 30(2)(b) amended to specify that operational creditors must receive at least the higher of the liquidation value and the amount they would receive if the company were to be liquidated. Clarified the minimum floor that SC confirmed in Essar Steel. |
| IBC Amendment Act 2019: Minimum payment to dissenting financial creditors | August 2019 | Section 30(2)(b) also mandated that dissenting financial creditors receive at least the liquidation value of their secured interest. This codified the principle upheld in Essar Steel that a minority CoC member cannot receive less than liquidation value. |
| Section 95 personal guarantee proceedings against promoters | 2019 onwards (rules) | The post-Essar Steel clarification that guarantees survive resolution enabled creditors to pursue guarantors simultaneously with IBC proceedings, a practice confirmed in subsequent Supreme Court judgments. |
Cases Directly Shaped by Essar Steel
Bhushan Steel was one of the other 12 RBI-directed IBC cases. Tata Steel acquired it in May 2018 for Rs 35,200 crore, before the Essar Steel Supreme Court judgment. However, Bhushan Steel’s CoC structure and distribution debates were directly shaped by the principles that were being litigated in Essar Steel simultaneously. The confirmation in Essar Steel that secured financial creditors receive priority gave the Tata Steel resolution plan retroactive judicial validation of its distribution approach, which had also provided minimal recovery to operational creditors.
Alok Industries, another RBI-directed case, was acquired by a Reliance Industries and JM Financial ARC consortium for Rs 5,050 crore. The operational creditor challenge to the distribution plan in Alok Industries was directly defended using the Essar Steel CoC commercial wisdom doctrine. The NCLAT upheld the plan, explicitly citing the Supreme Court’s November 2019 judgment that courts cannot interfere with the CoC’s commercial decision on distribution.
Future Retail’s IBC case involved multiple creditor classes with vastly different recovery rates proposed. Amazon’s litigation over a separate arbitration order ran concurrently with the CIRP. The principle that courts can review procedural compliance but not commercial decisions of the CoC, firmly established in Essar Steel, was repeatedly cited by the CoC to resist both Amazon’s challenges and operational creditor challenges to the distribution framework in Future Retail’s resolution plan.
The DHFL resolution, covered in our separate case study, was India’s first financial sector IBC case. The Piramal resolution plan’s distribution between institutional lenders and retail FD holders directly applied the Essar Steel principle that different classes of creditors can receive different recovery rates based on their security and contractual priority. The NCLT’s suggestion in DHFL to increase FD holder payout and the CoC’s 89.19% vote against that suggestion were entirely in line with the Essar Steel framework.
What Essar Steel Means for Each Stakeholder
What Banks and Financial Lenders Gained
- Permanent judicial confirmation that secured financial creditor priority survives into a resolution plan
- CoC commercial decisions cannot be overridden by adjudicating authorities on merits
- Personal guarantees from promoters survive the resolution and can be separately enforced
- Section 29A prevents defaulting promoters from buying back assets at discounts, reducing moral hazard
- A working precedent that IBC can achieve 92% recovery for secured lenders on a complex large-scale case
Challenges That Remain for Operational Creditors
- Approximately 4.3% recovery on Rs 4,976 crore in admitted claims: a near-total loss for trade creditors
- No CoC voting rights means operational creditors cannot influence the resolution plan’s commercial terms
- The minimum liquidation value guarantee is often close to zero for operational creditors in large steel or infrastructure insolvencies
- Claims above Rs 1 crore received negligible recovery while claims below Rs 1 crore received 100%, creating an arbitrary cut-off
- Statutory recognition of operational creditor disadvantage has not been accompanied by meaningful legislative improvement in their position
Closing Thoughts
The Essar Steel case was not merely India’s largest IBC resolution at the time. It was the case that decided what the IBC actually means. Every ambiguity in the 2016 legislation about who controls the process, what courts can review, who gets paid first, and who can bid for a distressed company was answered definitively in 28 months of litigation culminating in the November 2019 judgment.
For banks, the judgment was a decisive win. Secured lending in India now comes with a legally enforceable priority in insolvency that survives both regulatory tribunals and appellate courts. For operational creditors, the judgment was a hard lesson. Commercial contracts do not carry the same weight as secured loans when a company collapses. The liquidation value floor is real protection in theory but minimal comfort in practice when the liquidation value of an operational creditor’s claim is close to zero.
For ArcelorMittal and Nippon Steel, the perseverance through two years of litigation proved worth it. The plant that the Ruia family built over four decades into India’s largest single-location flat steel complex is now among the most productive steel facilities in Asia, generating EBITDA in the billions of dollars annually and planning to triple its capacity by 2030. The IBC delivered its intended outcome: a distressed asset of national importance did not go to liquidation. It found a better owner. That outcome is the judgment’s best defence.
A financial creditor is one to whom a financial debt is owed, meaning money lent in return for interest, such as banks, debenture holders, and bondholders. An operational creditor is one to whom an operational debt is owed in the course of providing goods or services, such as raw material suppliers, power companies, and unpaid employees. The IBC treats them differently in two fundamental ways. First, only financial creditors form the Committee of Creditors and vote on the resolution plan. Operational creditors cannot vote. Second, a resolution plan must pay operational creditors at least the liquidation value they would receive if the company were wound up, but this is a floor, not a right to equal treatment with secured financial creditors. The Essar Steel judgment confirmed both these distinctions.
Section 29A disqualifies certain persons from submitting resolution plans. The disqualified categories include the corporate debtor’s own promoters, directors, and key managers, their related parties and connected persons, and any person whose related entity has a non-performing asset or has been found to have abetted the corporate debtor’s default. In Essar Steel, this provision was used to disqualify both ArcelorMittal (whose related entity Uttam Galva had NPA accounts) and Numetal (which had a promoter-connected shareholder). The Supreme Court upheld Section 29A as constitutionally valid and confirmed that the purpose is to prevent those responsible for a company’s insolvency from regaining control of it through the resolution process at a discount, without accountability for the default they caused.
The commercial wisdom doctrine holds that the Committee of Creditors, composed of financial creditors who have lent money to the corporate debtor and have the deepest knowledge of its financial position, is the appropriate body to decide whether a resolution plan is commercially adequate. Courts have the authority to verify that a plan complies with the procedural and minimum payment requirements of the IBC. They do not have the authority to decide whether a different distribution ratio would have been better, or whether a creditor deserved more money than the CoC voted to give it. The Supreme Court established this in Essar Steel by overturning the NCLAT’s decision to redistribute the proceeds equally among all creditors, which had effectively substituted the tribunal’s commercial judgment for the 92.24% CoC majority decision.
Substantially yes, for the larger ones. Operational creditors with admitted claims below Rs 1 crore were paid in full under the CoC’s decision. Operational creditors with admitted claims above Rs 1 crore received a total of Rs 214 crore against admitted claims of Rs 4,976 crore, a recovery of approximately 4.3%. This means a power company or raw material supplier that was owed Rs 100 crore by Essar Steel received approximately Rs 4.3 crore. The justification under the IBC is that operational creditors are unsecured and their liquidation value claim is minimal. However, this outcome has driven sustained debate about whether the IBC’s treatment of operational creditors is just. Legislative amendments have made the minimum payment floor explicit, but the recovery rate for large operational creditors in major insolvencies continues to be very low.
The 180-day (extendable to 270-day) timeline applied to the core CIRP process. However, litigation challenging various decisions during the process was not strictly counted against this limit under the original IBC provisions. Multiple rounds of appeals on Section 29A eligibility, challenges to the distribution plan, Standard Chartered’s classification dispute, the NCLT’s approval order, the NCLAT’s modification order, and then the Supreme Court hearing collectively added over 500 days to the timeline. The IBC Amendment Act of 2019, upheld in the same Essar Steel judgment, addressed this specifically by introducing a 330-day mandatory outer limit inclusive of litigation periods. This was a direct legislative response to the delays that occurred in Essar Steel and other first-generation IBC cases.
The Ruia family, specifically Prashant Ruia and Ravi Ruia, lost control of Essar Steel India Limited when the IBC resolution was completed in December 2019. SBI moved to invoke personal guarantees given by Prashant Ruia and Ravi Ruia for approximately Rs 15,000 crore of Essar Steel’s debt, seeking attachment of their personal and global assets. The Ruia family continues to operate the broader Essar Group through Essar Global Fund Limited, which retains assets in energy (Essar Oil UK), ports, power, and projects. Shashi Ruia, co-founder of the group, passed away in August 2023. The loss of Essar Steel, which represented the core of the industrial legacy of the first generation, was the most significant corporate divestiture in the Ruia family’s history.
Standard Chartered Bank had extended a foreign currency loan to an overseas subsidiary of Essar Steel and held security over certain Indian assets. The Resolution Professional initially classified Standard Chartered as an unsecured financial creditor, which would have given it very limited recovery. Standard Chartered contested this classification extensively throughout the proceedings. On September 10, 2018, it was reclassified as a secured financial creditor. This improved its recovery under the ArcelorMittal plan. However, the original plan had offered Standard Chartered approximately Rs 60 crore against Rs 3,187 crore in claims (roughly 2%), and the dispute over adequate compensation for Standard Chartered continued before the NCLAT and the Supreme Court, contributing to the length and complexity of the litigation.
Disclaimer: This article is published for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal, financial, regulatory, or investment advice. All legal citations, financial figures, and procedural references are drawn from publicly available court orders, official NCLT and NCLAT judgments, the Supreme Court’s reported judgment in (2020) 8 SCC 531, official ArcelorMittal press releases, RBI public notifications, and the text of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and its amendments. All figures have been verified against primary or secondary sources as of June 2026. Readers should consult qualified insolvency or legal professionals before acting on any information in this article.





